The ‘anarchy' at Nanterre was swiftly denounced by the prominent government established student union, but this decree was largely ignored and the wave of student protests continued to spread. By May the focus of events had shifted to Paris itself, to the famous Sorbonne in the city's Latin Quarter. A series of marches and demonstrations followed with increasing police opposition, leading to the infamous ‘Night Of The Barricades' (10-11 May). Shocked at the extent of the Police brutality against the students, the main trade unions announced a General Strike for the following Monday (13 May) in solidarity with the students. There was also an element of opportunism here on the part of the Unions, as this provided a chance to campaign for better pay and conditions. During this period, when students and workers were on the streets together, a conscious effort was made by both the PCF (French Communist Party) and the CGT (the leading Trade Union) to keep the two protesting groups separate and distinct, the exact motives of which are examined below. Throughout May the General Strike intensified, as did the violence surrounding the constant protests and demonstrations, and the general mood of the public began to swing from general sympathy for the students (and workers) towards renewed support for de Gaulle's government.

Whilst the initial boost of having the Trade Unions on side threw considerable weight behind the students demands, within a month the combined forces of the movement were pulling in different directions. Skilful manouevering and negotiations between the Government and the Unions at the end of May had virtually ended the strike (which lasted in some quarters until late June), and had secured wage increases of up to a third (Thackrah, 1993, p258) in what was described as "the biggest benefits secured for the working class since the Liberation" (Seale & McConville, 1968, p176). Few workers remained on strike, but those that briefly did were vigorously supported on the picket lines by the students, where demonstrations were still breaking out into violent clashes with the CRS (riot police). The student presence at the factories had detracted from their previous stronghold on the university campuses and allowed the police to re-occupy the Sorbonne on 16 June. By now it was clear that the Government were winning the war of attrition, although they had never been in any real danger of losing it. By the end of June everyone had returned to work, the universities were back under government control, a host of student groups had been outlawed and most importantly the Gaullists had been supported in a landslide general election victory, returning to govern with a clear mandate from the French public. The promised reforms to the educational system were never fully implemented, with the result that a second, albeit less significant, wave of protest occurred in 1986, eighteen years after the original events of May.

After studying the chronology of events, it is possible to identify four crucial factors that can help us determine how revolutionary the French student movement was. The first factor, concerning the tactics used by the movement, can be used as a direct measurement of the students' revolutionary intent, or rather lack of. The other three have a more indirect influence on the student movement's revolutionary potential, and these are: the lack of cooperation from the established ‘adult' Left; the incompatibility of the workers' demands and the students'; and lastly, the lack of coercive force at the disposal of the student movement.

The student movement employed a variety of tactics, from conventional marches and demonstrations, through to the ‘occupation', or sit-ins, of various essential university buildings. Other more unusual tactics were also used, most notoriously on the ‘Night of the Barricades', when cars were overturned and cobblestones dug up from the streets of the Latin Quarter to build barricades across the street surrounding the Sorbonne. Police were eventually ordered in to clear the blockages, and this resulted in savage pitched battles between the stone-throwing students and the grenade throwing, truncheon-wielding CRS (Gretton, 1969, p300). In the latter stages, despite trade union attempts to prevent integration, students flocked to factory picket lines to support the striking workers. Whilst these tactics were in the main part unlawful to one degree or another (demonstrating was declared illegal on 11 June in the run-up to the election and many groups were simultaneously outlawed), they were not essentially revolutionary. There was to be no ‘storming of the Bastille' in 1968, no seizing of the winter Palace (Hamon, 1989, p20), not even a vain declaration of revolutionary intent at a Post Office. Even when presented with the opportunity to occupy a municipal or federal building, the student movement's leaders re-directed the march back to the Sorbonne. On one reported occasion, as the marching students passed the Ministry of Justice, the Minister and his staff ran out the back door in fear of the impending invasion (Hamon, 1989, p20). The lack of committed revolutionary tactics was due to the fear that such occupations would doubtless lead the Government to react with considerable force, resulting in loss of life. Unlike the guerillas of the Latin American and South East Asian jungles, the majority of the student ‘revolutionaries' were not prepared to die for the cause. As it transpired, a stand-off attitude largely prevailed, undoubtedly due to the hesitancy of the French administration to send in troops and tanks against a movement made up of their own sons and daughters.

To dismiss the entire student movement solely as rebellious teenagers protesting against the patriarchy of an older generation is a somewhat ill-considered and short sighted conclusion. Regis Debray, a French journalist imprisoned in Bolivia for alleged involvement with Che Guevara'a guerillas, was somewhat disenchanted with the student movement in France;

"For the stern and vituperative Debray the students were, unlike the real guerilla heroes of the Latin American jungle, simply play-acting; the revolutionary games of today were but a prelude to the well paid jobs of tomorrow to which higher education was a passport." (Hanley & Kerr, 1989, p3).

This point seemed all the more valid when a television documentary in 1988 revealed that most of the luminaries in the student movement (with the notable exception of Daniel Cohn-Bendit) had progressed to "successful entrepreneurial careers in the capitalist system they so detested" (Hanley & Kerr, 1989, p4). Despite the eschewment of revolutionary action by the student movement, it is indisputable that the May events ushered in a period of instability for the Fifth Republic and Charles de Gaulle. It was just this sort of instability that one would have expected the revolutionary left, with the students' assistance, to have prospered upon.

The second key factor is the role of the established Left in the crisis surrounding the May events. In the event that revolution had successfully been achieved, and the Gaullists vanquished, who would govern in their place? Whilst the students may have been the catalyst, "Cohn-Bendit was not going to preside over the first floor Cabinet meeting in the Elysée Palace" (Seale & McConville, 1968, p177). Indeed, Cohn-Bendit himself recognised the limitations on the student movement,

"It has grown much larger than we could have foreseen at the start. The aim is now the overthrow of the regime. But it is not up to us whether or no this achieved. If the Communist Party, the CGT and the other union headquarters shared it there would be no problem; the regime would fall within a fortnight" (Cohn-Bendit, interviewed by Sartre, in Bourges, 1968, p97).

If the students had attempted a true revolution, the lack of support from the established left-wing that would ultimately have led them to failure. The PCF and the CGT, both of whom shared the same executive committee, were opposed to any student involvement with the workers protests, even stewarding demonstrations to enforce segregation. This was despite originally holding the General Strike professedly in solidarity with the students following mounting police brutality. The reasons for segregation were twofold: the demands from the striking workers were primarily material, in that they sought wage rises,unlike the students (see below); and that in any case, the PCF was no longer a ‘revolutionary' communist party. In common with many of the European communist parties, the post-war period had seen a shift into mainstream parliamentary politics for the PCF. The Party had even embraced mainstream politics when they entered into a coalition with Mitterand's Socialists, and as a result were cautious to commit themselves to a revolution that, if defeated, would lead to the PCF's extinction. On the other hand, the more spontaneous groupuscules believed that the time was right for revolution, and debate raged;

"It is hard to believe the Party was not right in refusing to be stampeded into insurrection... the country as a whole was prosperous; the army were well-equipped and loyal to the regime; the ruling class were not ready to capitulate. Power was not so easily to be had." (Seale & McConville, 1968, p186).

The desertion of the striking workers, lured back to work after succumbing to the benefits of increased pay and benefits, adds weight to the PCF's argument. The CGT's policy of segregation, although not wholly effective, had been implemented with the intention of preventing the more post-materialist demands of the students (see below) from permeating into the workforce, who remained fundamentally motivated by their pockets.